The fundamental issues of maritime strategy and naval power in the Mediterranean, when considered over the broad spectrum of past, present and future, clearly touch on the clash of civilizations. In terms of the millennial political situation, this includes issues of migration, the environment, geography, technology, economic power and rivalries in those fields. It also touches on the structure and interplay of international politics and international law, as well as the traditional calculation of naval strength and diplomatic manoeuvre. It is such broad and fundamental themes that are explored in this volume, the product of the third Naval War College-Yale conference on maritime and naval history.
The very name "Mediterranean," stresses context: the sea among lands. In terms of international security policy and strategy in this maritime region, this volume demonstrates that sea power has a variety of contexts. These contexts have changed over time, although many of the contemporary issues that observers emphasize today are themes that have a long history of their own. Many of these same present and future issues have supplied the context for past events in the Mediterranean, but their importance has sometimes gone unnoticed in maritime history, as the maritime side of affairs has sometimes gone unnoticed within the common discussion of other specialized themes. As several contributors to this volume have suggested, it may be our understanding and our interpretations that must be stretched to include both sides of these issues, if we are to understand fully the varied contexts and impacts of events at sea.

A reassessment of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the second half of the seventeenth century, demonstrating that the conflict was primarily about trade. This book re-examines the history of Anglo-Dutch conflict during the seventeenth century, of which the three wars of 1652-4, 1665-7 and 1672-4 were the most obvious manifestation. Low-intensity conflict spanned a longer period. From 1618-19 hostilities in Asia between the Dutch and English East India Companies added new elements of tension beyond earlier disputes over the North Sea fisheries, merchant shipping and the cloth trade. The emerging multilateral trades of the Atlantic world added new challenges. This book integrates the European, Asian, American and African dimensions of the Anglo-Dutch Wars in an authentically global view. The role of the state receives special attention during a period in which both countries are best understood as 'fiscal-naval states'. The significance of sea power is reflected in the public history of the Anglo-Dutch wars, acknowledged in the concluding chapters. The book includes important new research findings and imaginative new thinking by leading historians of the subject.

A collection of essays on British and American maritime relationships in the 20th century together with details on the British organization of warfare, Anglo-American maritime theory, their rivalries and coalitions and their plans for dealing with a future war in the nuclear age.

The role and characteristics of armed force at sea in western Europe and the Mediterranean prior to 1650. This volume is both a restatement of current interpretations of sea power in the middle ages and the Renaissance and a general introduction to naval and maritime history over four and a half centuries. The book offers broad conclusions on the role and characteristics of armed force at sea before 1650, conclusions that exploit the best current understanding of the medieval period. The examination of naval militias in the Baltic, permanent galley fleets in the Mediterranean, contract fleets and the use of reprisal for political ends all illustrate the variety and complexity of naval power and domination of the sea in theyears from 1000 to 1650. The detailed and closely coordinated studies by scholars from Europe, North America, and Australia show patterns in war at sea and discuss the influence of the development of ships, guns, and the language of public policy on maritime conflict. The essays show theimportance and unique character of violence at sea in the period. Contributors: JOHN B. HATTENDORF, NIELS LUND, JAN BILL, TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN, IAN FRIEL, JOHN H. PRYOR, LAWRENCE V. MOTT, JOHN DOTSON, MICHEL BALARD, BERNARD DOUMERC, MARCO GEMIGNANI, FRANCISCO CONTENT DOMINGUES, LOUIS SICKING, JAN GLETE, N.A.M. RODGER, RICHARD W. UNGER.

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

This collection of documents reflecting the evolution of official thinking within the United States Navy and Marine Corps during the post-Cold War era concerning the fundamental missions and strategy of the sea services is part of a larger project designed to bring greater transparency to an important dimension of our recent naval history. This project was initiated by Professor John Hattendorf with his authoritative study in Newport Paper 19, which utilized much previously classified material, of the so-called Maritime Strategy developed and promulgated by the Navy during the 1980s. In the present volume, Newport Paper 27, covering the decade of the 1990s, Professor Hattendorf assembles for the first time in a single publication all the major naval strategy and policy statements of this period. Though all are public documents, most of these statements remain very little known and relatively inaccessible, at any rate outside the Navy itself. They are also not always easy to interpret, reflecting as they often do subtle shifts in emphasis or the nuances of internal bureaucratic argument rather than broadly understandable major changes in strategic thought or practice. Accordingly, the documents are accompanied by an introductory essay that attempts to put them in the proper historical and institutional perspective, as well as by a brief commentary for each that provides additional pertinent information and attempts to assess wider significance. A second Newport Paper dealing with comparable naval strategy statements of the 1970s and 1980s, in the same format and also edited by Professor Hattendorf. It is important to bear in mind that this material is not merely of historical interest. In his address to the annual Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in June 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations. Adm. Michael Mullen, announced his intention to craft what he called a new "maritime strategy" geared to the contemporary and emerging global security environment. The complex and not altogether happy story of earlier efforts within the Navy along similar lines can contribute in vital ways to preparing essential groundwork for such an undertaking.

To understand a series of events in the past, one needs to do more than just know a set of detailed and isolated facts. Historical understanding is a process to work out the best way to generalize accurately about something that has happened. It is an ongoing and never-ending discussion about what events mean, why they took place the way they did, and how and to what extent that past experience affects our present or provides a useful example for our general appreciation of our development over time. Historical understanding is an examination that involves attaching specifics to wide trends and broad ideas. In this, individual actors in history can be surprised to find that their actions involve trends and issues that they were not thinking about at the time they were involved in a past action as well as those that they do recognize and were thinking about at the time. It is the historian's job to look beyond specifics to see context and to make connections with trends that are not otherwise obvious. The process of moving from recorded facts to a general understanding can be a long one. For events that take place within a government agency, such as the U.S. Navy, the process cannot even begin until the information and key documents become public knowledge and can be disseminated widely enough to bring different viewpoints and wider perspectives to bear upon them. This volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding and generalization for the subject of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy during the last phases of the Cold War. To facilitate this beginning, we offer here the now-declassified, full and original version of the official study that I undertook in 1986-1989, supplemented by three appendices. The study attempted to record the trends and ideas that we could see at the time, written on the basis of interviews with a range of the key individuals involved and on the working documents that were then still located in their original office locations, some of which have not survived or were not permanently retained in archival files. We publish it here as a document, as it was written, without attempting to bring it up to date. To supplement this original study, we have appended the declassified version of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Estimate of March 1982, which was a key analysis in understanding the Soviet Navy, provided a generally accepted consensus of American understanding at the time, and provided a basis around which to develop the U.S Navy's maritime strategy in this period. A second appendix is by Captain Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and consists of his annotated bibliography of the public debate surrounding the formulation of the strategy in the 1980s, updated to include materials published through the end of 2003. And finally, Yuri M. Zhukov has created especially for this volume a timeline that lays out a chronology of events to better understand the sequence of events involved. The study and the three appendices are materials that contribute toward a future historical understanding and do not, in themselves, constitute a definitive history, although they are published as valuable tools toward reaching that goal. To reach closer to a definitive understanding, there are a variety of new perceptions that need to be added over time. With the opening of archives on both sides of the world, and as scholarly discourse between Russians and Americans develop, one will be able to begin to compare and contrast perceptions with factual realities. As more time passes and we gain further distance and perspective in seeing the emerging broad trends, new approaches to the subject may become apparent. Simultaneously, new materials may be released from government archives that will enhance our understanding.

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John Hattendorf, is the thirtieth in the Newport Paper monograph series and the second in a projected four volume set of authoritative documents on U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning. The first volume in this series, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27, also edited by Professor Hattendorf, appeared in September 2006. The current volume was originally intended to include documents relating to the development of the Navy's "Maritime Strategy" during the 1980s, but the bulk of relevant material has made it advisable to dedicate a separate volume to that period; this is due to appear shortly. A final volume will then cover documents from the 1950s and 1960s.When combined with Professor Hattendorf 's authoritative narrative of the genesis and development of the "Maritime Strategy," The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19, these volumes will provide for the first time a comprehensive picture of the evolution of high-level U.S. Navy (and to some extent U.S. Marine Corps) strategic thinking over the half-century following the end of World War II. Many of the documents reprinted here were-and were intended to be-public statements. In all cases, however, these documents remain little known and mostly inaccessible, certainly outside the Navy itself. It is important to emphasize that they need to be read with careful attention to their historical and institutional contexts. They are in any case not always easy to interpret, and they differ substantially in the weight they carried at the time or later. For these reasons, we have felt it essential to present the documents accompanied by a general introductory essay that locates them in their appropriate contexts, as well as by brief commentaries on each providing additional pertinent information and attempting to assess their wider significances. This project, it is hoped, will contribute importantly not just to our understanding of our recent naval history but also to the serious study of military institutions, strategy, and planning more generally. Also, it is worth noting that this material is of more than merely historical interest. The U.S. Navy (with its sister sea services, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard) is currently on the verge of completing a major review of its naval and maritime strategy in a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing global economic interdependence. This exercise, whatever the immediate result may prove to be, has unquestionably served the valuable purpose of stimulating serious thought about fundamental strategic issues at many levels throughout the Navy. These volumes can be expected to be an important resource in a continuing process of strategic assessment and education as the Navy continues to adjust to a rapidly evolving security environment.

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents is the thirty-third in the Naval War College Press's Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected four volume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distinguished naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf 's uniquely informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy's strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy's reaction to the growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as documented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007), and sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy's role following the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, as presented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27 (2006). Both of these volumes were also edited by John Hattendorf. A fourth volume, of documents on naval strategy from the 1950s and 1960s, will eventually round out this important and hitherto very imperfectly known history. This project will make a major contribution not just to the history of the United States Navy since World War II but also to that of American military institutions, strategy, and planning more generally. Including as it does both originally classified documents and statements crafted for public release, it shows how the Navy's leadership not only grappled with fundamental questions of strategy and force structure but sought as well to translate the strategic insights resulting from this process into a rhetorical form suited to the public and political arenas. Finally, it should be noted that all of this is of more than merely historical interest. In October 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, unveiled (in a presentation to the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College) "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," the first attempt by the sea services of this country to articulate a strategy or vision for maritime power in the contemporary security environment-a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing global economic interdependence. It is too early to tell what impact this document will have on the Navy, its sister services, allies and others abroad, or the good order of the global commons. To understand its meaning and significance, however, there is no better place to begin than with the material collected in this volume and its forthcoming successor.

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents is the thirty-third in the Naval War College Press's Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected fourvolume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distinguished naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf 's uniquely informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy's strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977- 1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy's reaction to the growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as documented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007), and sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy's...

Originally published in 1991 this is a rReprint of volume 9 of the U.S. Naval War College historical monograph series.

Although Theodore Roosevelt has been the subject of numerous books, there has not been a single volume that traces Roosevelt's interaction with the U.S. Navy from his work as a naval historian in the 1880s through his leadership of the Navy as president in the early twentieth century. The editors of this volume fill in this gap in the historical literature. Each essay in this collection by leading historians of American naval history will cover one aspect of Roosevelt's relationship with the Navy while addressing the unifying theme of his use of history and America's naval heritage to advocate for strengthening and modernizing the Navy during his own lifetime. In addition to the book editors, contributors are: Sarah Goldberger, James R. Holmes, David Kohnen, Branden Little, Jon Scott Logel, Edward J. Marolda, Kevin D. McCranie, Matthew Oyos, Jason W. Smith, and Craig L. Symonds.